

Secure PTP - Protecting PTP with MACsec without losing accuracy



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Security issues with PTP

- ▶ It is possible to “spoof time” and attack PTP if the PTP traffic is unencrypted/unprotected
- ▶ Small cells are often placed in areas that do not provide physical protection
- ▶ Enterprise femtocells may use an existing Ethernet network in the buildings for both user traffic and PTP timing
- ▶ PTP for frequency (G.8265.1) is often running inside tunnels (EVCs) along with the customer traffic and the customer traffic must be encrypted
- ▶ There is no standard security protocol specified for PTP
 - ▶ Annex K in IEEE1588-2008 is known to be flawed and will be deprecated in next revision of the standard
- ▶ Many government regulations require information to be encrypted
- ▶ 3GPP TS 33.320 requires that the time delivery to Home Node B must be delivered over a secure backhaul link.

IEEE1588



Time Security

Networks Operate on Precision



Mobile Communications

What if Network Time is Compromised?

- No access to network
- Calls will drop
- Poor coverage and throughput

Smart Energy

- Time errors can trigger faults in power grid

Financial / Trading

- Smart Order routing for large trades requiring simultaneous execution on multiple exchanges may not function properly

Low latency security in conjunction with nanosecond-level time stamp synchronization is critical to network infrastructure



What about IPsec?

- ▶ **IPsec is sometimes used today to protect the mobile user traffic**
- ▶ **But...**
 - ▶ It can only protect IP traffic and G.8275.1 uses PTP over Ethernet directly
 - ▶ IPsec prevents the use of 1-step hardware timestamping as PTPoIP is in the IP payload
 - ▶ IPsec encryption/decryption at the end of the EVC creates very large Packet Delay Variation
 - PDV happens outside the EVC and thereby not part of the SLA for the EVC connection
 - Large PDV caused by IPsec decryption is preventing accurate timestamping after decryption




MACsec 101

- ▶ **MACsec is a layer 2 security protocol – IEEE802.1AE**
- ▶ **Provides strong 128/256bit encryption or protection with using the GCM-AES cipher suite**
- ▶ **Uses IEEE802.1X for authentication**
- ▶ **MACsec protects against**
 - ▶ Passive wiretapping
 - ▶ Masquerading (MAC address spoofing)
 - ▶ Man-in-the-Middle attacks
 - ▶ Certain Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks
- ▶ **Designed for implementation in hardware (high bandwidth, low latency)**
- ▶ **Under consideration for next release of IEEE1588**




MACsec Frame Format

Untagged Ethernet



MACsec adds a SecTAG after the source address and an ICV field after the payload, protecting the complete frame


Standard MACsec format




Provider Bridges can add/remove VLAN tags to the encrypted frame.

Some devices support bypassing existing VLAN tags when performing MACsec encryption/decryption


MACsec plus Single Tag Bypass



MACsec plus Dual Tag Bypass




MACsec inside an MPLS EVC




Protects MEF EVC payload while allowing network to push/pop VLAN tags and MPLS labels, as well as mark the frames for SLA-compliance (policing result)




MACsec is normally point-to-point




MACsec in Mobile Backhaul with IEEE-1588



MACsec can be used to protect EVCs



MACsec for EVC protection through access provider network



PTP phase over PTP-unaware/partially aware network – G.8275.2 (future)

PTP frequency over PTP-unaware network – G.8265.1

Customer data can be protected using the same MACsec protected EVC




PTP and MACsec working together

- ▶ **PTP-aware networks needs the ability to timestamp PTP frames on every port.**
- ▶ **MACsec protected networks encrypts/decrypts at the port/MAC**
- ▶ **By combining both functions in the same silicon it is possible to provide accurate timestamping of PTP frames**
- ▶ **Only solution to provide PTP 1-step operation**
 - ▶ Significantly reduces the software load

IEEE1588



Maintaining 1588 Accuracy with MACsec



- ▶ **MACsec processing introduces highly variable delays, standard MACsec destroys 1588 accuracy**
 - ▶ This is true even if 1588 remains unencrypted while other data is encrypted.
Example: If the 1588 packet is immediately behind a packet that will be encrypted later, the encrypted packet grows by 24-32 bytes, delaying the 1588 packet by 192-256 ns compared to the case where the 1588 packet is behind a packet that won't be encrypted.



Test Results



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VSC5621 Evaluation Board

► Complete Carrier Ethernet Switch with software

► Uses:


- VSC7460 Carrier Ethernet Switch
- VSC8584 Quad 1000BASE-T PHY with 1588 and MACsec
- VSC8490 Dual 10G PHY with 1588 and MACSec

► FIPS197 certified 256 bit MACsec solution



Test Setup – Timestamp Accuracy

- ▶ PTP Master DUT and PTP Slave/Probe DUT is frequency locked to the same reference clock
- ▶ One DUT is configured in PTP probe (PTP slave) mode to measure received timestamp accuracy from PTP Master compared to the internal time in the DUT
 - ▶ Test results will show the combined accuracy of the DUT probe (down to 1 ns depending on the DUT) and the PTP Master
 - ▶ DUT probe produces PDV result data in Symmetricom Timemonitor format
 - ▶ DUT in slave mode output 1PPS and allows measurement of 1PPS performance.



VSC8490 Test Result

► Easily meets the Class B limit

► See details in the following slides

VSC8490	Test result w/o MACsec	Test result with MACsec	Class B limit
Constant Time Error, cTE	-3.3 ns	2.9 ns	20 ns
Dynamic Time Error MTIE (filtered)	157 ps	420 ps	40 ns
Dynamic Time Error MTIE (unfiltered)	4 ns	4 ns	
Dynamic Time Error TDEV (filtered)	14 ps	35 ps	4 ns
Dynamic Time Error TDEV (unfiltered)	460 ps	400 ps	
Maximum Time Error (unfiltered)	5.0ns	4.5 ns	70 ns



VSC8490 TE(t) - Unfiltered


► LAN mode without MACsec enabled

Symmetricon TimeMonitor Analyzer

Phase deviation in units of time; Fs=15,90 Hz; Fo=10,00000 MHz; 1970-01-01 00:06:21

Two-Way Normalized Offset Phase; Samples: 9513; Initial phase offset: -3,50000 nsec


Vitesse Test Probe/1588 Timestamp Data/Transmit and receive Timestamp; MasterUUID: 0001c1ffffxxxxxx; MasterIP: n.a.; ProbeUUID: 0001c1ffffxxxxxx; ProbeIP: n.a.



VSC8490 dTE MTIE - Unfiltered

► LAN mode without MACsec enabled – 4 ns


Symmetricon TimeMonitor Analyzer
MTIE; F₀=10.00 MHz; F_s=15.90 Hz; 1970-01-01 00:06:21
Two-Way Normalized Offset Phase: Samples: 9513; Initial phase offset: -3.50000 nsec
Vitesse Test Probe/1588 Timestamp Data/Transmit and receive Timestamp; MasterUUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; MasterIP: n.a.; ProbeUUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; ProbeIP: n.a.



VSC8490 dTE TDEV - Unfiltered

► LAN mode without MACsec enabled – 460 ps


Symmetricon TimeMonitor Analyzer
TDEV: F₀=10.00 MHz; F_a=15.90 Hz; 1970-01-01 00:05:21
Two-Way Normalized Offset Phase: Samples: 9513; Initial phase offset: -3.50000 nsec
Vitesse Test Probe/1588 Timestamp Data/Transmit and receive Timestamp; MasterUUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; MasterIP: n.a.; ProbeUUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; ProbeIP: n.a.



VSC8490 dTE MTIE - Filtered

► LAN mode without MACsec enabled – 157 ps


Symmetricon TimeMonitor Analyzer
MTIE; F₀=10.00 MHz; F_s=15.90 Hz; 1970-01-01 00:06:21
Two-Way Normalized Offset Phase: Samples: 9513; Initial phase offset: -3.50000 nsec
Vitesse Test Probe/1588 Timestamp Data/Transmit and receive Timestamp; MasterUUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; MasterIP: n.a.; ProbeUUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; ProbeIP: n.a.



VSC8490 dTE TDEV - Filtered

► LAN mode without MACsec enabled – 14 ps


Symmetricon TimeMonitor Analyzer
TDEV: F₀=10.00 MHz; F_a=15.90 Hz; 1970-01-01 00:05:21
Two-Way Normalized Offset Phase: Samples: 9513; Initial phase offset: -3.50000 nsec
Vitesse Test Probe/1588 Timestamp Data/Transmit and receive Timestamp; MasterUUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; MasterIP: n.a.; ProbeUUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; ProbeIP: n.a.



VSC8490 TE(t) - Unfiltered

► LAN mode with MACsec enabled


Symmetricon TimeMonitor Analyzer
Phase deviation in units of time; Fs=15,90 Hz; Fo=10,000000 MHz; 1970-01-01 00:16:25
Two-Way Normalized Offset Phase; Samples: 79404; Initial phase offset: 1,50000 nsec
Vitesse Test Probe/1588 Timestamp Data/Transmit and receive Timestamp; MasterUUID: 0001c1fffexxxxx; MasterIP: n.a.; ProbeUUID: 0001c1fffexxxxx; ProbeIP: n.a.



VSC8490 dTE MTIE - Unfiltered

► LAN mode with MACsec enabled – 4 ns


Symmetricon TimeMonitor Analyzer
MTIE; F₀=10.00 MHz; F_s=15.90 Hz; 1970-01-01 00:16:25
Two-Way Normalized Offset Phase: Samples: 79404; Initial phase offset: 1.50000 nsec
Vitesse Test Probe/1588 Timestamp Data/Transmit and receive Timestamp; MasterUID: 0001c1ffffxxxxx; MasterIP: n.a.; ProbeUID: 0001c1ffffxxxxx; ProbeIP: n.a.



VSC8490 dTE TDEV - Unfiltered

► LAN mode with MACsec enabled – 400 ps


Symmetrix TimeMonitor Analyzer
TDEV: F₀=10.00 MHz; F_s=15.90 Hz; 1970-01-01 00:16:25
Two-Way Normalized Offset Phase: Samples: 79494; Initial phase offset: 1.50000 nsec
Vitesse Test Probe/1588 Timestamp Data/Transmit and receive Timestamp; MasterUID: 0001C1FFFExxxx; MasterIP: n.a.; ProbeUID: 0001c1FFFExxxx; ProbeIP: n.a.



VSC8490 dTE MTIE - Filtered

► LAN mode with MACsec enabled – 420 ps


Symmetricon TimeMonitor Analyzer
MTIE; F₀=10.00 MHz; F_s=15.90 Hz; 1970-01-01 00:16:25
Two-Way Normalized Offset Phase: Samples: 79404; Initial phase offset: 1.50000 nsec
Vitesse Test Probe/1588 Timestamp Data/Transmit and receive Timestamp; MasterUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; MasterIP: n.a.; ProbeUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; ProbeIP: n.a.



VSC8490 dTE TDEV - Filtered

► LAN mode with MACsec enabled – 35 ps

Symmetricon TimeMonitor Analyzer
TDEV: F₀=10.00 MHz; F_a=15.90 Hz; 1970-01-01 00:16:25
Two-Way Normalized Offset Phase: Samples: 79404; Initial phase offset: 1.50000 nsec
Vitesse Test Probe/1588 Timestamp Data/Transmit and receive Timestamp; MasterUUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; MasterIP: n.a.; ProbeUUID: 0001c1fffexxxx; ProbeIP: n.a.



Summary And Conclusions

- ▶ PTP is now being used to provide timing and synchronization with insufficient physical security
- ▶ Protecting the PTP traffic by means of encryption and/or integrity protection is needed.
- ▶ IPsec is often used for data traffic, but this is not a practical solution for accurate PTP transfer that needs hob-by-hop support.
- ▶ IPsec is not a good security solution for PTP due to the large and variable processing delays.
- ▶ MACsec is a layer 2 encryption protocol that is a perfect fit for protection of PTP traffic – hob-by-hob, or end-to-end.
- ▶ It is shown how MACsec can be used to protect the PTP traffic without impacting the accuracy and how MACsec can be easily implemented in a systems architecture.



Thank You



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